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20 September 1976

MEMORANDUM FOR: DDCI

SUBJECT

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: Conversation with Ambassadors Resor and Dean

1. The DCI asked me to attend his meeting at 1000 this morning with Ambassadors Resor and Dean so that I could communicate to you anything significant which took place.

2. Much of what Resor had to say pertained to recent MBFR history, with which you are quite familiar. He mentioned that you had done a "first-rate job" in your VP presentation. He also referred to the "superlative support" he received from

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He made favorable references as well to the reporting from but both he and Dean made strong pitches for additional human source reporting on Bloc and Soviet order of battle, particularly Soviet T/O in the area. Lastly, he requested MBFR requirements be given high priority in appropriate defector debriefings. mentioned correctly - nad supped through the fingers of U.S. intelligence before he could be questioned on the spot by qualified persons. The DCI

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mentioned that

Ambassador Dean suggested this data could possibly have an MBFR application.

3. Ambassador Resor declared that MBFR was a more important process than it had been given credit for. First, it provided us with an indication of Soviet intentions. Time would soon tell whether the Soviets considered detente significant enough for them to make adequate concessions in the MBFR arena. Moreover, if we and our NATO allies continued to pressure them, it was more likely that they would make concessions. Furthermore, if we did reach an agreement with the Soviets on force levels in Western Europe, it would provide a framework within which we could hold our NATO allies to their own agreed upon force levels.

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5. At the conclusion of our discussion the DCI asked his guests if they had any views or information on the recent

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said that it was fairly certain the guilty party had not been involved with hostile espionage, but his motivations for his "homework project" remained unclear. The State Department was trying to institute separation procedures, but Subject was fighting them. He had hired a lawyer who was demanding that the Department show that his client's lapse had caused serious damage. This in turn required a statement from us or NSA, or both, detailing the specific damage done. It was Dean's impression that we had not been forthcoming with such a statement. I said that the last memorandum I had seen merely indicated that the Department was going to contact us on this matter. The DCI, commenting that any statement along the lines requested could in itself be damaging from a sources and methods standpoint, requested me to contact Mr. Gambino and get a reading on where we stood.

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